We discuss how regression discontinuity designs arise naturally in settings where rms target marketing activity at consumers, and illustrate how this aspect may be exploited for econometric inference of causal eects of marketing eort. Our main insight is to use commonly observed discontinuities and kinks in the heuristics by which rms target such marketing activity to consumers for nonparametric identication. Such kinks, along with continuity restrictions that are typically satised in Marketing and Industrial Organization applications, are sucient for identication of local treatment eects. We review the theory of Regression Discontinuity estimation in the context of targeting, and explore its applicability to several Marketing settings. We discuss identiability of causal marketing eects using the design and show that consideration of an underlying model of strategic consumer behavior reveals how identication hinges on model features such as the specication and value of structural parameters as well as belief structures. We emphasize the role of selection for identication. We present two empirical applications: the rst, to measuring the eect of casino e-mail promotions targeted to customers based on ranges of their expected protability; and the second, to measuring the eect of direct mail targeted by a B2C company to zip-codes based on cutos of expected response. In both cases, we illustrate that exploiting the regression discontinuity design reveals negative eects of the marketing campaigns that would not have been uncovered using other approaches. Our results are nonparametric, easy to compute, and control for the endogeneity induced by the targeting rule.
Introduction
Targeting is a ubiquitous element of rms' marketing strategies. The advent of database marketing has made it possible for rms to tailor prices, advertising and other elements of the marketing mix to consumers based on their type (e.g., Rossi, McCullogh and Allenby 1996) . The measurement of the causal eects of such targeted marketing is however tricky. A rst-order complication arises as observed correlation in the data between outcome variables and marketing activities is driven both by any causal eects of marketing and by the targeting rule, leading to an endogeneity problem in estimation. The commonly used solution of instrumental variables may be infeasible in such contexts because a good instrument, a variable that is correlated with the marketing eort, but otherwise uncorrelated with the outcome variable, may be hard, if not impossible, to obtain. In this paper, we propose utilizing heuristic rules often used by rms for targeting as a Regression Discontinuity design to nonparametrically measure the causal eects of marketing eort.
Regression Discontinuity (henceforth RD) was rst introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) in the evaluation literature (e.g. Cook and Campbell 1979) , and has become increasingly popular in program evaluation in economics. An RD design arises when treatment is assigned based on whether an underlying continuous sore variable crosses a cuto. The discontinuity induced by this treatment rule induces a discontinuity in the outcomes for individuals at the cuto. Hahn Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemiuex (2010) are excellent summary papers on RD that discuss the method, its variants and applications in detail.
We believe targeted marketing contexts are particularly well-suited for the use of RD methods for two reasons. First, rms often target groups of customers with similar treatments. Even though rms face a continuous distribution of consumer types, it is common in actual business practice to allocate similar marketing interventions to groups of customers. The reasons for this bunching include menu or implementation costs, or the inherent diculty of tracking historical information required for targeting at the individual-customer level. Second, targeting policies of rms often involve trigger rules. Marketing allocation often involves rules-of-thumb whereby groups of consumers obtain similar marketing levels based on whether a relevant function of their characteristics or historical behavior crosses a pre-specied cuto. For instance, catalogs might be mailed based on cutos of underlying RFM' score variables, credit card promotions may be given based on cutos of FICO c scores, detailing calls may be made to a physician based on whether he is in specic prescription-based deciles, price discounts may be given to people above or below certain age cutos, etc. The ubiquity of such triggerrules generate a wealth of discontinuity-based contexts that facilitate nonparametric identication of marketing eects using an RD design, which have previously been unexploited in the Marketing literature.
Applying RD in Marketing and Industrial Organization contexts, where theoretical and empirical models of strategic choice are abundant, naturally leads us to consider the extent to which these models relate to the identiability of RD. We consider permutations on simple models of consumer selection to delineate a set of viable and non-viable applications for RD. First, we present a Hotelling-style model to show that if customers face suciently high costs of selecting, RD is valid. The model illustrates that RD can often be used to measure marketing eects under geographic targeting (i.e. high xed costs of moving to receive the treatment), or situations where targeting is based on scores that cannot be changed, such as age-based marketing (i.e. innite xed cost of selection). We then apply RD to a geographic targeting example where the score variable is a function incorporating the probability of response at the zip code level. Direct mail is sent to a zip code if the probability of response is above a cuto.
Second, we present a detailed illustration of targeting based on past purchases. When past purchase behavior crosses a threshold, customers qualify for preferential treatment. We show that applicability of RD hinges on whether or not customers are uncertain about the exact score, the cuto, or both.
The implication is that canonical reward programs where thresholds and scores are communicated to customers have selection eects that invalidates RD. On the other hand, database marketing programs, where typically both the score and cuto are unknown to consumers, are valid RD applications even in the presence of selection.
1 To illustrate the value of RD in database marketing, we analyze data from a casino's marketing eorts to members of its loyalty program. The casino uses a targeting rule that is discontinuous based on cutos in the average level of past gambling activity. These cutos are not known to the consumers and hence, they cannot self-select into preferential treatment. We estimate the eect of both the database marketing and geographic targeting applications nonparametrically using local linear regression (Fan and Gijbels 1996) . We nd in both cases that controlling for the endogeneity has large implications on the conclusions drawn from the analysis. In particular, we nd that a naive estimate has an altogether dierent sign than the RD estimate.
Finally, we also formally consider time as a score. We illustrate that the validity of the RD in the timing case hinges on whether or not the estimation is conditional on selection decisions such as purchase or store visitation as well as the belief structures leading to these decisions. We discuss the role of dynamics induced by durability or storability in the interpretation and identication of treatment eects in a time-based design. An important takeaway from these analyses is that the identication conditions cannot be evaluated without consideration of an explicit structural model of behavior of agents that is representative of the underlying data generating process. Our analysis illuminates an RD Paradox: the design is often thought of as atheoretic or assumption-less, but identication often relies on crucial, sometimes non-transparent primitive assumptions regarding behavior.
We consider the RD design to be complementary to several alternative methods focused on uncovering causal eects. Randomized variation through experiments are ideal, but rms are often unable 1 For instance, pharmaceutical rms use volumetric deciles of physicians to decide the number of detailing calls made to doctors. These deciles are category specic and doctors are unlikely to know their own prescription volumes relative to all other physicians for each category. Similarly, consumers are unlikely to know their RFM score or the trigger values used for targeted mailing of catalogs. or unwilling to conduct randomized trials, due to considerations of cost, time and potential backlash from consumers not receiving preferred treatment. When experimentation is unavailable, RD may be more viable for targeted marketing applications. One popular alternative is to use instrumental variables, but such variables are hard to obtain because customer-side variables typically fail the required exclusion restrictions and cost-side variables typically do not vary by the segment the rm uses for targeting. Another alternative is to augment the analysis with a model of how rms allocate marketing eorts and to incorporate the restrictions implied by this model in estimation (e.g., see Manchanda et al. 2004; Otter et al. 2011 ). These authors are careful to point out that this approach is feasible only if full information is available to the analyst about how the rm allocates its marketing eorts. In the absence of such information, the analysis is sensitive to misspecication bias.
The main caveats for adopting the RD approach are three-fold. First, by its nonparametric nature, the estimator is data intensive and requires many observations on consumer behavior at the cuto; in sparse-data situations, parametric approaches are more suitable. Second, the estimator provides a local treatment eect which is relevant only for the sub-population of consumers at the cuto, and not globally.
2 A third caveat is that, like any other alternative, the conditions for the validity of the estimator have to be carefully assessed depending on the context. We consider the last aspect especially crucial. The HTV (2001) conditions on identication are stated in terms of continuity of counterfactual outcomes at the cuto. We discuss in detail how these conditions can be translated in practice to several commonly observed targeted marketing situations. A key point we wish to emphasize is that the validity of the RD design has to be based on a formal model of data generating process, by explicitly considering how consumers sort at the cuto.
To summarize, this paper makes three contributions. First, we identify the ready application of the RD design to typical targeted marketing contexts. Our goal is not to present new estimators per se, but to point out how discontinuous rules-of-thumb, which are pervasive in real-world marketing situations, may be used to achieve nonparametric identication. Further, we point out that such rules-of-thumb, which have been typically treated as nuisance issues to be dealt with, are a source of 2 In many situations, this may precisely be the object of interest for inference. Measurement of treatment eects for the entire population would require more assumptions, or the restrictions from a formal model of behavior.
identication of the causal eects of marketing activities. Second, we present detailed illustrations of the identiability of causal marketing eects using the design, and show theoretically the conditions under which the RD estimator may be valid in marketing contexts, considering in particular, the role of consumer self-selection. The link to a structural model, and the treatment of identication in the context of such a framework, is new to the RD literature. Finally, we demonstrate the utility of the RD approach through two empirical applications, with counter-intuitive conclusions that are hard to uncover through a naive analysis.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We rst provide a brief review of the identication conditions for the RD estimator. We then discuss our theoretical and simulation results on identication of marketing mix eects under specic targeting situations. We then present our two empirical applications. The last section concludes.
Identication of Marketing-Mix Eects Using an RD Design
In this section, we review identication conditions from HTV (2001), Lee (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010) and discuss the role of local inference in Marketing contexts.
Identication Conditions
The following describes the key identication conditions from HTV (2001). To set up the notation, let 
is observed by the analyst for each i. Instead, the focus is on measuring
, where the expectation E (.) is taken over individuals (or the density of individual-types). The RD design implies that treatment is assigned depending on whether a continuous score, z i , crosses a cuto,z, i.e., d i = I (z i z). Then, the observed size of the discontinuity in the outcome (Eq. 1) and the treatment (Eq. 2) in a neighborhood ofz are,
Theorem 1 @r @PHHIAA uppose (1) 
That is, to obtain a causal eect of the treatment, we estimate the discontinuity in the outcomes, and weigh it down by the discontinuity in treatments. 
Thus, continuity of counterfactual outcomes at the cuto is violated, and the RD is invalid.
4 By implication, the RD design is equivalently invalid if the distribution of the score z given type θ is not continuous at z =z. By Bayes rule, the conditional density of types given the score is h (θ|z) =
, implying that a discontinuity in f (z|θ) will make h(θ|z) discontinuous as well.
The continuity condition is invalidated in the context of selection. Assume that agents have control over their score. If they can precisely control their score and have an incentive to select into treatment, the distribution of the score z will not be continuous at the cutoz, since the agents immediately to the right of the cuto are those who chose to select into treatment, while those to the left of the cuto chose not to be treated. Nevertheless, Lee (2008) and Lee & Lemieux (2010) idea that when the score includes some random noise, the continuity conditions may still be satised and a valid RD design obtained. Formally, let the score now have a component to the utility that is not predictable and not controllable by the agent. Thus, z = x + w, where x is the systematic part of the score that the agent can predict and can take actions to control, and w is an exogenous random chance component to the score which cannot be predicted or controlled by the agent.
If w has a continuous density, the distribution of z at the cutoz is locally continuous, thus validating the RD design. This results from the fact that agents are unable to select precisely into treatment. Thus, in the neighborhood of the cutoz, the distribution of agents on either side of the cuto is the same. In the above notation, h (θ|z) is continuous at z =z, validating the RD design. If, on the other hand, w is either zero (i.e., there is no random, unpredictable component to the score) or is discontinuous atz, then the randomness cannot validate the design.
The continuity condition is also violated if the cutos on the score variable that dene treatment is chosen at a point of discontinuity in the score. In some Marketing contexts, for instance, this may happen because competitive promotions use the same cutos for treatment, or because rms use natural points of discontinuity in the score as cutos for assigning consumers to the treatment. The latter is typically associated with sparse data in the neighborhood of the cuto, or the use of structural breaks in the score to decide the cutos.
Local Inference and Marketing
As previously mentioned, RD estimates an eect that is local to a particular value of the score. This could be problematic when designing a marketing policy for the entire distribution of customers in a database. If a rm were to only set one cuto, we might worry the rm would not set that cuto exactly where the eect of the marketing policy is largest, or even where the magnitude is expected to be the average eect. Therefore, if rms nd large local eects, their optimal response is to move the cuto to include more customers until the marginal benet of the treatment is roughly equal to the incremental cost of the treatment.
How does such a strategic cuto setting process aect inference? It remains true, per the preceding subsection, that the eects are valid treatment eects at the cutos. Yet, it is clear the treatment eects are not randomly sampled points from the distribution of the score. Practitioners should therefore be cautious in interpreting the results. We recommend the use of multiple cutos and movement of cutos in response to either negative marginal eects or large marginal eects. Through such a process, rms will retain the simplicity of classifying customers into a limited number of targeted groups for Marketing, while also reducing the loss associated with under-or over-incentivizing some set of customers.
Geographic Targeting
We begin by considering an example of geographic targeting. This simple application is instructive for two reasons. First, the requirement for identication is simply that the cost of moving residences is substantially larger than benets of preferential marketing. Second, this model allows us to clearly illustrate the identifying conditions from HTV. We wrap up this section with an empirical analysis of geographic targeting using RD.
Model
We dene a model that reects our empirical application where consumers are targeted preferential direct-mail based on their location. The model involves two stages. Initially, each consumer is endowed with a score z, which can be thought of as his location on a Hotelling line. In the rst stage, the customer makes a selection decision to move his location toz, which we call the manipulated score.
If the consumer decides not to move to a new location, his manipulated scorez remains the same as his initially endowed score z. Ifz z , the consumer is eligible for the treatment. In the second stage, the customer makes a decision about the outcome of interest, conditional on his treatment eligibility. The rational consumer takes the eect of treatment on outcomes in the second stage into account when making a selection decision in the rst stage. We consider the two stages of the model in reverse, considering the second stage rst and then using the optimality condition from the second stage into account in solving for the optimal decision in the rst stage.
Stage 2: Outcome
The outcome Y is a binary variable indicating whether or not an individual makes a purchase. Treatment is indicated by the binary variable R = I (z z). We model the individual's outcome as a random utility model Y = I (u 1 > u 0 ), where,
Here, v (.)-s indicate the non-stochastic portion of the individuals utility of choosing to purchase, and η = (η 1 , η 0 ) are mean-zero unobservables (to the econometrician) that aect purchases. We introduce these unobservables so as to clarify the separate role played by unobservables aecting selection versus those aecting purchase, in ensuring identication.
Stage 1: Selection
In the rst stage, each customer can choose to manipulate his current score toz = z + m. Changing the score is not costless. The total cost of moving has a xed and marginal component, C = F + τ m.
A consumer at z would move to the cutoz if the expected value from obtaining the treatment is greater than the cost,
The marginal customer that selects into treatment is dened as z * such that,
Identication
We now consider whether an RD applied to this context is valid. Validity depends on whether continuity of the manipulated scorez is violated at the cuto,z. Continuity ofz depends on whether the marginal consumer has a score z * less than z. If, z * <z, all consumers between [z * ,z) would move. Hence, the score would have positive mass to the right ofz, but no mass just to the left ofz. Thus, the distribution ofz would jump atz, invalidating the RD. Another intuition is to note that with such selection, the limit of the counterfactual outcome just to the left ofz does not exist. Formally, the condition for RD to be invalid, z * <z, implies from Equation (6) 
if the xed costs of moving are not higher than the gain from moving, selection can invalidate an RD application by violating continuity in the score relevant for treatment.
Heterogeneity We now consider if heterogeneity of consumer types can resolve this identication problem. For instance, heterogeneity in θ = (F, τ, β) could imply that there exist at least some mass of consumers to the left ofz, who may not move (for example, individuals with very high xed costs).
This ensures that the limit of the counterfactual outcome from the left exists. However, unless ll customers have suciently large xed costs, the RD is not valid. Mathematically, it is easier to see this in terms of checking the continuity of the counterfactual outcomeY in the absence of treatment, R = 0. The limit of the counterfactual outcome from the left ofz is,
while the limit from the right ofz is,
In the presence of selection, the set of consumers to the right of the cuto would have lower τ and F , and higher β than those to the right. Hence, F θ|z (θ|z <z) = F θ|z (θ|z z) and the left-hand sides of Equations ( (7)) and ( (8)) are not the same. Hence, heterogeneity does not guarantee validity of the RD design. This can be mitigated only if θ is such that no one moves in order to obtain treatment, which is likely if the xed costs of moving are large enough compared to the benets of obtaining the reward R.
Discussion
The above analysis suggests that geographic targeting will plausibly be a valid RD application because preferential marketing treatment (e.g. receipt of catalogs) is unlikely to ever be large enough to outweigh the costs of moving. However, applying RD to geographic targeting relies on an underlying model of customer selection as well as the denition and magnitude of structural parameters such as moving costs. Moving outside of the geographic space as the underlying score variable may involve much smaller moving costs that could invalidate RD applications.
Direct-Mail Activity by a Direct Marketing Firm
We consider a canonical marketing problem: measuring the causal eects of direct-mail. Our application involves a direct marketing rm sending direct-mail to customers to solicit a request for contact with the company. Once the customer contacts the company (either online or via the phone), further promotions and prices are oered in order to acquire the customer. We focus on whether or not the customer contacts the company as the response variable of interest. Measuring the eect of directmail is not straightforward, as the rm does not randomly choose consumers to send the direct mail solicitations to. Rather, as response rates are small for this mode of marketing (of the order of 1-2%), the rm tends to send direct-mail to customers it anticipates are most likely to respond. The rm's targeting is at the level of a zip code, i.e. it chooses to send direct mail to all consumers in the zip code or to none. Importantly, the rm decides the choice of zip codes in which to send direct mail to customers based on cutos on a one dimensional score variable, which is an (unknown to us) function of customer characteristics, past response histories and other features of the zip code. The question of interest is whether direct mail solicitations causally aect the number of customer contacts. We observe the score variable, the cuto, a treatment variable indicating whether or not direct mail was sent as well as the customer contacts for each of the zip codes in six dierent states in the US. The dependent variable is whether or not a customer in a zip code contacts the company.
We conduct four kinds of analysis on this data to illustrate the application of RD to this geographical targeting context, and report these results in Table 1 . First, we test for dierences in mean customer contact rates for those zip codes in which consumers received the mail solicitation vs. zip codes in which consumers did not receive mail solicitations, and we do this separately for each of the six states in our data. These mean dierences are identical to the slope coecients for an OLS regression of direct mail solicitations on the customer contact rates. These results, reported in the top panel of the table, would seem to suggest a signicantly positive eect of direct mail solicitation on customer contact rates. However, this is a naive analysis, that does not account for the fact that zip codes with higher scores are selected for the direct mail campaign, presumably because they have higher expected customer response rates.
We next discuss the RD estimates for the eect of direct mail solicitations on customer contact
rates. Specically, we compare the limiting values of the customer contact rates for zip codes with scores in the neighborhood of the cuto and on the two sides of it to measure the causal eect of the direct mail solicitation. The identifying assumption for the causal eect using RD in this application is that the benets from receiving the direct mail solicitation are small compared to the xed costs of moving to a dierent zip code, and hence it is implausible that consumers select into treatment. We compute the limiting values of the customer contact rates using local linear regressions on the two sides of the cuto. In the middle panel of Table 1 , we report the RD estimates with optimal bandwidth computed separately for each of the six states in our data, since the cutos dier by state. In any RD application, we need to choose the bandwidth around the cuto in which the analysis is done. We focus on the bandwidth that minimizes mean squared error.
The results of the RD estimates computed for the optimal bandwidth show that the causal eect of direct mail is positive only in Tennessee, and is actually negative in Arizona and Wisconsin. The remaining three states have no signicant eect of the direct mail solicitation on response rates. While the null eects in Washington, New Jersey and Minnesota are not necessarily surprising, the negative eects in Arizona and Wisconsin are. We conjecture, but cannot verify, that these may reect an adverse reaction to direct mail activity due to heavy direct mail activity by the rm in the past. Another explanation is that in Wisconsin, for instance, consumers who were picked out for this campaign were subject to heavy direct mail by competitors.
We assess sensitivity of the results to the bandwidth selected. In the bottom panel of the Table, we report the RD estimates when the bandwidth is 50% higher than the optimal bandwidth. We nd that the estimates for Arizona are not robust to the change of bandwidth, while those in Wisconsin are.
This illustrates the fact that in RD designs, bandwidth selection is an important part of the process of inference. 
Model
Once again, the model reects one of our empirical applications where we consider a reward program in which a casino oers short-lived promotions to gamblers based on a score computed as a function of their past gambling activity. Unlike in a geographical targeting application, xed costs to consumers of changing gambling amounts are likely quite low, so the validity conditions in the previous section do not apply. However, in the context of this application, we show that an RD design continues to be valid if consumers have uncertainty about the exact score or cuto used by the rm to target promotions.
This requires augmenting the model to allow for uncertainty and randomness t the seletion stge.
Our analysis reveals that the role of this randomness is subtle and context specic. We show that the extent to which such randomness can smooth out the discontinuity induced by selection depends on the nture of the rndomnessD nd the preise detils of how it 'ets ehvior. We build on the contribution of Lee (2008) , which pointed out that randomness in the score can validate RD designs, by discussing how this aspect requires a careful consideration of an underlying behavioral model for assessment.
Setup
Consider a simplied promotion program that provides a reward R to consumers if an index of their past outcomes, z, crosses a cuto,z. In the casino application, R can represent play credits given to consumers, and z can represent an index of the dollar amount a consumer has played with the casino in the past (we present specic details in section 4.2). Here, R is the treatment, z is the score andz is the cuto at which a discontinuity arises. The econometrician wishes to measure a treatment eect of the reward on current outcomes (e.g. how much the consumer plays today) by comparing the behavior of consumers just to the right ofz to those just to the left ofz. Consumers are forward-looking, know the reward R and initially also know the cutoz and their score, z. Customers have an incentive to play to earn the reward when their current score is below the cuto, but a reduced incentive to play with the objective of earning a reward when their current score already exceeds the cuto.
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As before, we consider a two-stage model. In the rst stage, the consumer makes a selection decision.
He enters the rst stage with no rewards, and with score z. Based on z, R and his characteristics, he evaluates whether to self-select and play in the rst stage in order to earn a reward in the second.
Selection adds m to z, and the manipulated score is thenz = z + m. If the consumer chooses to not select into treatment, the manipulated score remains the same as the original score, i.e.z = z.
In stage two, those consumers with manipulated scorez z obtain the reward R. Then, condi-5 Such incentives have been shown to be nontrivial empirically -for instance, Nunes and Dreze (2010) document that airline consumers just below the 25,000 miles cuto are signicantly more likely to y to earn a frequent-ier reward than those just above. As we show, this type of discontinuity invalidates RD applications in the case of frequency reward programs.
tioning on their treatment status, all consumers make an outcome decision denoted as Y = Y (z, R, η),
where η is an unobservable (to the econometrician).
The econometrician observes {Y,z} across a sample of consumers in the neighborhood ofz, and wants to estimate the eect of the treatment R on outcomes Y . Note that the action of playing is both a selection action as well as an outcome of interest, albeit at two dierent stages.
In contrast to the previous model, we now allow for some randomness. We allow selection to be stochastic by introducing a shock ε that represents random events in the casino that aect consumer's selection decisions. This shock is unobserved to the econometrician, but observed by consumers. To reect the dependence on ε, we denote the selection decision by an indicator y = y (m, z, R, ε). 6 Thus, this setup builds on that in section (3) by a) allowing ε to inuence the selection decision; and b) making actions at the selection stage discrete.
The manipulated score,z, can be written as,
Following a canonical discrete-choice set-up, we assume that y is determined based on an inequality condition involving consumer's type, his state, z, and the realization of the error, ε,
We do not explicitly write out the deterministic component, f (m, z, R), but implicitly, this would be the dierence between the choice-specic value function associated with playing and earning a reward and that for not playing. Consider a consumer 1 with z just to the left ofz such that z ∈ [z − m,z).
Given selection, the induced distribution of his manipulated scorez is,
To examine the implications of selection for the induced distribution ofz, note that in general,
we expect that f (m, z, R|z <z) > f (m, z, R|z z), as we expect that consumers who do not have the reward but are close to it derive a net value from self-selecting that is higher than that derived 6 To be clear, ε is an unobservable that aects the selection decision, y, while η is an unobservable that aects the outcome decision, Y .
by those who already have the reward.
7 This implies that post selection, the manipulated score for consumers who start just below the cuto will jump to have higher mass to the right of the cuto. As the proportion of consumers who purchase at the selection stage is higher just below the cuto than just above, the density of the manipulated score has a discontinuity at the cuto. A discontinuity in the density of the manipulated score at the cuto implies a discontinuity in the types just to the left and the right ofz, and RD is invalidated by selection. This intuition is demonstrated graphically in Figure 1 .
Discussion We just demonstrated that selection in a typical reward program invalidates the RD design. Recent literature has suggested that random factors that drive outcomes (such as ), can make RD designs valid even in the presence of selection. Casual intuition may suggest that if random events shift consumer's gambling amounts around a known cuto, it could be that the distribution of types at the cuto is as if it were randomized, and the RD may be valid. Here, we show that this intuition is not general and does not hold in the example shown above. Specically, it fails because, as Lee (2008) suggests, the realization of the randomness to the agent must occur fter selection for the randomness to smooth out the discontinuity in scores. The above analysis makes this intuition specic.
Mitigating Selection: Uncertainty
Uncertainty about the Score Now we consider if uncertainty (from the consumer's perspective) in the manipulation of the score can mitigate the issues raised by selection. We generate the uncertainty by adding an additive shock to the manipulated score. This shock represents aspects of the score that cannot be controlled by the consumer at the selection stage. We assume this uncertainty has a continuous density.
8 We therefore modify equation (9) to include a random term, w,
7 This can be seen from the fact that the value of selecting is a function of the additional utility derived from getting the treatment, weighted by the increase in probability of treatment that comes from choosing to play at the selection stage. For consumers with z <z, the probability of getting treatment increases when the consumer selects. However, for consumers with z >z, this is not true.
8 In principle, the RD estimate nds the limits of the outcomes for consumers on two sides of the cuto, and therefore the distribution of w can have innitesimally small variance. In practice, since RD estimates involve comparing consumers in a certain bandwidth on two sides of the cuto, we assume that the distribution of w needs to have suciently large bandwidth relative to this bandwidth for the purpose of this discussion. The key addition in this specication, w, is an error term that represents the consumer's uncertainty about the eventual realization of the score. This may occur, for instance, if consumers forget their past play since it has been too long, or if consumer's do not know the exact score used by the rm.
9 Assume that w has a continuous density with full support over (z − h,z + h) , where h is the bandwidth dening the neighborhood of the cuto used for estimation. While the econometrician does not observe either ε or w, the consumer observes ε prior to the selection decision, but not w. Introduction of w thus removes the ability of agents to sort preisely around the cutoz. 10 Following the intuition proposed in Lee (2008), we illustrate how this aspect restores the validity of the RD in spite of selection.
Consider two individuals in a neighborhood ofz, such that individual 1 lies close to the left and individual 2 to the right of the cuto i.e., z 1 <z and z 2 z . Consider the distribution of the 9 Or alternatively, the rm may induce some uncertainty. For example, the rm informs all consumers who are close to, or have just earned a reward, that they are enrolled in a lottery for potential miles.
10 Note the implicit requirement that the randomness w has full support in the region (z − h,z + h) of the cuto. For instance, suppose the casino never changes its reward rules, and hence, those to the right of the cuto (individual 2 in the example above) can never forfeit their earned reward. In this case w has only positive support for individuals 3 and 4, and the distribution ofz2 will be truncated below atz. This generates a discontinuity in the distribution ofz across all individuals atz, and RD is invalid. Continuity of the density of w is also important. Obviously, if the density of w is discontinuous, the required smoothing is not achieved. manipulated scorez 1 for individual 1 implied by the modied score determination rule in Equation (11) .
We can think of the distribution ofz 1 induced by Equation (11) as the following mixing distribution,
Thus, the distribution ofz 1 is obtained by taking a weighted average of the PDF of w, evaluated at the translated location parameters z 1 + m or z 1 , and weighted by the probabilities that y = 1 or 0, given that z 1 <z. If one observes individual 1 in repeated trials, his manipulated score will accumulate mass to the right ofz as long as Pr (y = 1|z 1 <z, ) > 0. However, due to the additional density of w, this distribution will be smooth. The distribution of the score for individual 2 to the right ofz, will analogously be determined as in Equation (12), except the weighting probabilities are evaluated at the right of the cuto, e.g., Pr (y = 1|z 2 z). The implication of the additional source of uncertainty can now be claried. We see that randomness in w makes the distribution ofz smooth atz for every individual. The distribution across individuals is a weighted average of the distribution for each individual. Because the distribution for every individual is smooth and continuous atz, the distribution ofz across all individuals will also be smooth and continuous atz. Continuity implies the distribution of types just to the left and right ofz =z is the same, and hence it is as if there is local randomization at the cuto. Consequently, the RD design is now valid. To the extent that such randomness is plausible in many contexts, RD designs maybe considered very similar to quasirandomized experiments (see for e.g., Lee and Lemiuex 2009). Note that the validity of the RD depends crucially on a struturl element of the modelD i.e., the beliefs of consumers about the score.
Uncertainty About the Cuto While an astute customer may occasionally be able to perfectly know their score, it is much less likely that a customer knows the cutos in a given database marketing program. In this case consumers may have a continuous belief distribution over the cutos. We now consider whether uncertainty about the exact cuto at which rewards may be earned may be enough to ensure the validity of the RD design even in situations where consumers observe their score perfectly.
Analyzing this aspect is more complicated, as it requires us to be more explicit about the choice-specic value functions that generate the function f (m, z, R) in Equation (10) .
We start with the basic model without other sources of randomness (i.e. no w) i.e.z = z + my.
To dene a customer's selection/play decision, we begin by specifying f (m, z, R) = V 1 (m, z, R|β) − V 0 (m, z, R|β), where, the choice-specic value functions, {V 1 , V 0 }, are dened as,
Here, v 1 (.) is the deterministic component of the per-period value from playing which depends on whether the consumer has a reward or not, and the ε-s are stochastic unobservables (to the econometrician) as before. δ is the consumer's discount rate. The expected future value from choosing the action y is,
That is, if the consumer is able to cross the required cuto by choosing y today, I (z ≥z) = 1, and he will have the reward R andz = z + my tomorrow. If he chooses to play tomorrow, he obtains payo v 1 (R|β) + η 1 ; otherwise, he obtains only η 0 . The value from the best possible action tomorrow conditional on earning the reward is the maximum of these two payos. If on the other hand, he is unable to cross the cuto by selecting to play today, I (z <z) = 1, the value from the best action tomorrow is analogously the maximum of the two payos, but evaluated at R = 0. However,z and η = (η 1 , η 0 ) are unknown at the time of selection. Hence, the future value involves integrating outz and η over the consumer's beliefs over these variables. In Equation (13) the consumer's beliefs over the cuto z is represented by a continuous density, Gz (z), and his beliefs over the random shocks η by the density F η (η 1 , η 0 ). Moving the integration into the brackets, and noting that Pr (z ≥z|m, z, y) ≡ Gz (z), we can write Equation (13) as,
where Gz(z) represents the cumulative density function of the consumer's beliefs aboutz
With some abuse of notation, let, Ω (z + m, z|R, β) = EV (z, R|m, z, y = 1) − EV (z, R|m, z, y = 0), the relative expected future value from selection versus not. We can evaluate Equation (14) at y = (1, 0) 11 to obtain,
Intuitively, Equation (15) implies that the future component of the incentive to select/purchase is the dierence in expected utility under treatment and not, weighted by the increase in the probability of receiving treatment that is due to adding m to the score, i.e. Gz (z + m) − Gz (z). The decision to select is given now as,
We can represent the distribution induced by this type of selection on the manipulated scorez as,
Proposition 2 he distriution of £ z is ontinuous t the true uto'F reneD the h is vlidF
Proof. First, x the value of the cuto actually used by the rm atz. Now note that the density of z will be continuous at the true cutoz if the mass ofz that piles up to the left and right ofz due to selection is the same. This will be the case if, (1) Pr (y = 1|m, z, R) is the same just to the left and to the right of z =z − m, and, (2) Pr (y = 0|m, z, R) is the same just to the left and to the right of z =z. Gz (z) = 1 (19) as the consumer on the right gets the reward for sure. Hence, with a known cuto, Gz (z + m) − Gz (z)
jumps from 1 to 0 , as one moves from the left to the right ofz. Essentially, the smoothing generated by the continuity of the density Gz (.) is lost.
This intuition is depicted in Figure 2 , which is analogous to Figure 1 that depicted the situation with a known cuto. In this gure, we assume for the sake of simplicity, that z is uniformly distributed and that the uncertainty about the cuto also has a uniform distribution. In other words, the true cutoz =z + w, where w ∼ U nif orm[−w,w]. Consumers do not know what w is but know its distribution. Figure 2 shows that the induced distribution of z is smooth, thereby ensuring the validity of the RD.
Uncertainty about m Another form of uncertainty could be uncertainty about m, or in other words, the eect of the selection decision on the score. We discuss this situation in Appendix 2 for the purpose of keeping this brief, but we demonstrate there that this kind of uncertainty is insucient to make the RD design valid in the presence of self-selection. This underscores the importance of considering the specic nature of uncertainty and its implications on consumer behavior to assess if uncertainty or randomness more generally can resolve the identication issues in an RD context in the presence of selection.
What is the composition of agents for whom treatment is measured?
While the identication conditions laid out in Section 2 dene when a treatment eect can be measured for those agents clustered around the cuto, the composition of those agents can be very dicult for Therefore, we have a treatment eect that is averaged across a sample of individuals; we cannot hone in on the specic sub-population for whom this treatment eect is relevant without further assumptions.
While this challenge is not solvable without a structural model and the elusive belief data, we suggest using applications where there are many cutos to learn about the distribution of treatment eects across types. Our empirical application of casino promotions includes ve separate cutos, providing us the ability to nd the treatment eect of casino promotions for consumers of dierent proles, albeit locally at these cutos.
Discussion The above analysis documents that traditional reward programs where the cutos are communicated to customers are not valid RD applications. However, targeted marketing based on purchase histories in which there exists uncertainty about the program, the scores or cutos are viable RD applications, as long as consumers have a continuous distribution of beliefs about the uncertainty.
Uncertainty about the value of rewards does not restore the validity of the design. In our casino application below, identication of the RD estimator is provided by both uncertainty about the score as well as that about the cuto. Customers are unlikely to know their score because their past gaming behavior is aected by their luck and the casino's algorithm for adjusting their expected worth for luck.
This score was not communicated to consumers either. Further, the program involves oers sent to customers based on cutos that were not provided to the public. Customers may not even know that they would get these oers, or that they dier from other customers in the nature of the oers they receive, but even if they suspected this, they would not know what cuto the rm used for determining preferential treatment.
Targeted Promotions Emailed by a Casino
In this section, we apply the regression discontinuity approach to assess a casino's database marketing program. Two reasons make our application to marketing activity at casinos compelling. First, targeted marketing is an important component of customer management at casinos (Lal and Carrolo, 2001 ).
Second, casino-based applications are particularly data-rich and thus well suited for application of nonparametric methods. Casinos typically send oers to casinos either by direct mail or email, oering packages that include discounted room rates, show tickets, dining credits, and promotional credits.
Consumers are classied as low-rollers and high-rollers, with more lucrative oers to the high-rollers.
Importantly, the classication of consumers into low or high-rollers, and the subsequent allocation of promotional oers to these tiers is determined on the basis of a one dimensional, continuous score, referred to as the Average Daily Win (henceforth ADW). The ADW is the casino's best estimate of the average revenue the casino can earn from the customer per day of his visit, after controlling for luck.
12 We have access to the ADW for all customers in the data, but not the proprietary algorithm that generated the ADW. In addition, we also have access to the cuto of ADW on the basis of which customers are sorted into tiers. While consumers are aware that more play will move them into higher tiers and earn them more comps, they are unaware of the exact denition of the ADW, or the ADW-specic cutos that generate sorting into tiers. This aspect mitigates selection concerns in this application. In Table 2 we provide an example of a casino mailing to 79,419 customers in which the oer depends on the casino's calculation of the average daily win (ADW) they expect from the customer.
13
We observe four such mailings between January and September 2006. All mailings are identical except in terms of the show ticket oerings, which vary across mailings. Further, the rst mailing is only sent to the top two tiers. Importantly for the subsequent analysis, the pattern of higher tiers obtaining superior oers reected in Table 2 holds across mailings (i.e., tiers 0 and 1 receive one oer and tiers 2 through 5 receive a dierent oer that is inferior to the one received by the top two tiers).
This systematic targeting is one reason why comps and subsequent play will be positively correlated.
We wish to measure the causal eect of comps and promotions. We consider two outcome variables that are relevant to the casino, viz. whether the customer visited the casino (rip) and the casino's expected win from the customer (heoretil in). The theoretical win is similar to ADW in that it adjusts for the customers luck. It diers in that it recalculates the spending on a given occasion as opposed to providing a measure of the expected spending on any given day. These are summarized, by tier, in Table 3 . We see from Table 3 that customers in the top two tiers arrive with about 23%
play and the other lost all $100 on their rst play.
13 Note that the highest rollers, customers with ADW above $2,500, are not included, as the casino deals with such customers on a one-to-one basis. Customers with ADW less than $50 are sent emails but do not receive special oers such as discounted rooms or credits. Table 4 : OLS Regressions of Casino Outcomes on Tier probability, while customers in the bottom tier only arrive with 7.5% probability. There are also substantial dierences in spending by tier, with the bottom tier having theoretical wins averaging only $10 while customers in the top tier have theoretical wins that average $617.
ADW

Analysis: Correlational Eects
One obvious pattern from Table 3 is that both outcome variables are increasing in the tiers. A pure correlational analysis that does not control for this targeting rule would pick up this positive correlation and falsely infer it as an eect of the promotion. As a benchmark, we start by regressing the outcome variables on tier xed eects, which implicitly capture the eect of changing a promotion from the base tier to those for that tier. We pool observations across all four mailings while including period xed eects to account for dierences across the timing of mailings. Table 4 presents the results.
The OLS estimates with visit and theoretical win as the dependent variables are listed in the last two rows of Table 4 . The visit variable is coded as 1 in case of a visit and 0 otherwise. 14 To obtain unconditional (of visit) eects, the Theo variable for a customer who does not visit is included as a 0 in the regression. For ease of interpretation, the incremental dierence in the actual promotions when going from tier τ to (τ + 1) are also listed in the top panel. Looking at Table 4 , it would appear that the promotions have strongly positive eects, with higher tiers having higher visit probabilities and higher theoretical wins. Moving to a non-linear model would not fundamentally alter these results as they are driven by the underlying correlations between the tiers and the two dependent variables.
Analysis: Causal Eects
The OLS estimates reported in Table 4 are problematic due to two reasons. First, the estimation does not control for the targeting employed by the casino, thereby overstating the eect of the promotion.
This induces a classic endogeneity bias into measurement. Second, by imposing a (linear) functional form to hold globally across all types of customers and tiers, the estimator leverages the information from all of the observations to learn about the promotional eects, despite the fact that the variation in the oers really only occurs at ADW levels of $100, $200, $300, $500, and $1,000. This results in misspecication bias of an unknown form. We address both issues with the RD estimator. Table 5 presents estimates of the RD estimator applied to these data. As in the previous analysis, we pool across all four mailings to estimate the treatment eects using the RD design, while controlling for period xed eects.
15 Following the suggestion of Imbens and Lemieux (2008) , we estimate these nonparameterically using a rectangular kernel, using observations within a bandwidth of size h on either side of each cuto. Because there are six dierent tiers, and ve dierent ADW cutos, we estimate ve dierent regression discontinuity specications focusing on each tier cuto. In practice, this turns out to be least squares estimators using only observations lying in the neighborhood dened by the bandwidth on either side of each of the cutos. An advantage of this approach is that the 14 We choose OLS to illustrate the pitfalls of not accounting for the endogeneity. More sophisticated statistical specications (e.g. count models, or discrete link functions) will not change the message from this analysis, as long as they interpret the full correlation of outcomes and tier-status as eects of the promotion. squares. We also estimated the RD using local linear regression (not reported), and found the results to be similar. As in all nonparametric applications, an important aspect of the estimation is correct choice of the bandwidth. We choose the band-width by cross-validation. We conduct a search for the band-width of ADW that minimizes the mean square error across the ve cutos. We also present the estimates for an arbitrarily chosen bandwidth of $20.
Referring to Table 5 , we see that eects of the marketing program on visit probabilities are all insignicant except for the transition from tier 2 to tier 1 (ADW = $500) and 4 to 5 (ADW = $100).
However, both these negative eects are not robust to changes in the size of the bandwidth. We therefore conclude that the casino oers are neither increasing nor decreasing the probability that a customer visits the casino. This is surprising because there is substantial variation in the price of a room. However, elasticities may be low because of other substantial costs of visiting a casino in Las Vegas or because the room is only a small part of the expenses of these gamblers.
We see similar patterns when analyzing the theoretical win of the customers. Most notably, most of the eects are negative or insignicant. A negative eect is plausible, as provision of dining credits and show tickets can draw customers away from the slots and the gambling tables. We conjecture these credits may substitute for actual gaming. Using a band-width of $20 for the ADW, we see there is a positive, but insignicant, jump in theoretical win at ADW= $500. But under the optimal band-width, which is smaller, we nd that evidence reverses: there is a large negative eect of the increased promotions when moving from Tier 2 to Tier 1. This reversal also underscores importance of considering robustness to choices of band-width, and the dangers of pooling data across very dissimilar observations. To reiterate the point, we present a plot of theoretical win at ADW = $1, 000, where there is a change of tiers from 1 to 0.
Overall, while the general relationship between theoretical win and ADW is positive, in the limit exploring the variation in a neighborhood of the discontinuities, the eects are either not signicant or negative. One interpretation of the results is that comps and hotel credits are not signicant drivers of consumer's decisions to visit or to play at the casino, but competition forces the casino to continue marketing in spite of the low returns. Alternatively, comps aect long-run considerations like building loyalty to the casino, even though in the short-run, they do little to shift visits or play. The other interpretation of the results is that they provide some evidence of short-term inecient marketing decision making at the rm. The bottom-line is that the analysis reveals that the marketing-program we analyzed at the casino is not working: the comps are either ineective or losing money. This is a signicantly dierent conclusion from the previous correlational analysis. Nevertheless, it is possible that such an ineective program may be a necessary competitive response to other casinos that oer similar programs. Our analysis can only speak to the protability of the parameters of the program, as opposed to the need for the program as whole.
Discussion
The RD approach in our two applications revealed several null, or negative eects. The reader should not infer this to imply that the approach will yield null eects always; the right inference is that much of the observed positive correlation in the data in both contexts is due to the targeting rule, and not due to the marketing activity. It is important to point out that null eects for the direct-mail company We discuss two aspects of the design that are relevant to time-based RD-s. The rst relates the nature of the outcome being measured, and the second, to demand-side eects owing from the type of product considered.
Nature of Outcome being Measured To understand this point, consider analyzing data from an initial decision and then a conditional decision by consumers. Assume a continuous distribution of customers over time, f (z) (the top panel in Figure 3 ), where z denotes time. Let the rst decision be indicated by y z = I (g (R z |θ) + ε z > 0). To x ideas, call it the store visit decision. R z denotes whether there is an increased incentive (e.g. a price discount for some product at the store) that makes customers more likely to visit at time z. g (R z |θ) is the non-stochastic portion of a customer's payo for this choice. This payo is similar to Equation (10) except that time is the score. θ includes parameters for the store choice decision as well as parameters for any conditional decisions, such as purchase. ε z is an unobservable (to the researcher) that aects the store visit decision. The potential for RD arises when the incentive, R z , discontinuously changes at z =z. Such a discontinuity in the incentive induces a discontinuity in the probability of the store visit as depicted in the second panel of the gure. The treatment eect of the change in R z on the store visit decision is identied by RD because the distribution of the score, f (z), is continuous at the cuto.
Next, consider any outcome conditional on having visited the store, such as whether or not to purchase. In terms of empirical implementation, this would entail analyzing data only on those consumers who visited the store. The RD estimator in this case will analyze the purchase decisions of only those customers that entered the store just before and after the price change, i.e. consumers for whom g (R z |θ) + ε z > 0 for z =z ± h, where h is a small bandwidth of time. The manipulated score in this case is the timing of the store visit,z. Together, the distribution of the initial score (top panel) and the store visit probability (second panel) generate a manipulated score, f (z), (bottom panel). The distribution of this manipulated score is discontinuous because g (R z |θ) changes discontinuously and consequently, P r [g (R z |θ) + ε z > 0], and f (z) also become discontinuous. As shown before, a discontinuity in the score invalidates RD. When measuring treatment eects on an outcome conditional on visit, the only case in which RD with time as a score is valid is when ll consumers visit the store with no precise knowledge of whether the promotion is in eect or not -both before and after the promotion begins. In such a case, the rst (visit) decision is unaected by the promotion and RD is valid.
Finally, to close the discussion, consider estimating the eect of the promotion on the joint outcome of visiting the store and purchasing. In terms of empirical implementation, this would entail analyzing the demand data of all consumers who could potentially visit the store (i.e., the demand of those who did not visit should be included as a zero in the estimation data set). The relevant score is now time itself, and the RD validly measures the eect of the promotion on demand. The key insight here is that what is being measured matters: RD designs work when the outcomes are unconditional on timing decisions by consumers, but may not when analyzing outcomes conditional on a timing chosen by customers, depending on the nature of consumer beliefs.
Nature of Product and Dynamics The second aspect to consider is the nature of the product for which we measure promotion eects. Busse et al. (2006) point out that if the good is durable or storable, forward-looking and price sensitive consumers will tend to queue up after previous promotions as in a Sobel-style model (Sobel 1984) . The promotion occurs at timez. At timez − h, only those customers who cannot wait for the next promotion, visit the store (and make purchase decisions).
However, atz + h, all customers who would have potentially bought since the past promotion visit.
Revisiting our analysis, the store visit eect is identied. However, the purchase decision conditional on visiting atz − h vs.z + h, compares two dierent types of customers: price-insensitive or impatient consumers who buy prior to promotion with price-sensitive or patient consumers who wait for the promotion. More generally, forward-looking behavior and expectations accentuate issues related to dynamic selection. Assuaging dynamic eects is important to validate time-based RD designs.
We stated above that RD estimates a valid treatment eect when time itself is the score, but not when the score is a timing chosen by the customer. However, a vexing issue is that both cases measure eects that are relevant to a sub-population selected by dynamic considerations: the Rd's treatment eect is a function of the distribution of the state variables for the consumers who visit.
The consumer's states are a function of the rm's past actions, which makes comparing the estimated treatment eects across studies dicult, unless the rm's history is held constant across studies. For instance, in a storable good model, the key state aecting purchases is inventory, which is a function of past promotions. Fong et. al. (2010) nd that the RD estimand over time using historical data on promotions does not perform well compared to a randomized experiment in which base-prices across products and stores are changed for storable, grocery goods. The RD application is valid because time itself is the score, not a timing chosen by customers. But, the measured treatment eects are a function of inventories realized at the time of the temporary price changes (for the RD), or the base-price change (for the experiment). For the random experiment and the RD to yield the same results, the researcher would have to ensure the rm's promotion history prior to both the RD and the experiment are the same. This is dicult to ensure in practice. Of course, this is the case for comparing any two estimators with state-dependent treatment eects.
 
tics pervasive in marketing practice. These heuristics had previously been thought of as a nuisance issue that had to be dealt with in estimation by researchers, or as evidence of inecient marketing decision-making by rms. Here we show that the heuristics actually aid estimation by facilitating identication, and are also useful to rms as they enable credible measurement of the return-on-investment on their marketing spends. We illustrate the approach using two empirical applications. Our quasiexperimental approach reveals negative eects of marketing mix variables that are not easily uncovered otherwise.
We expect our approach to controlling for the endogeneity to be used in conjunction with other approaches for understanding demand under targeting. Treatment eects obtained via the design may be combined with estimates from structural models to improve or audit results (e.g. Khwaja et. al.
2010 for the case of a matching estimator). Further, parametric models of heterogeneous demand can provide the continuous representation of heterogeneity that rms could use to better dene cutos when using group-level targeting. Better measures of heterogeneity will improve heuristic thumb-rules used for targeting, even if rms are unable to implement the individual-level policies that can be suggested by individual-level models. Parametric methods for solving the endogeneity that enable pooling are also essential in sparse-data situations. In data-rich environments, we hope this paper encourages further exploration of the use of nonparametric methods to facilitate optimal marketing mix allocation. 
